Date: Sat, 15 Jul 95 09:03:38 PDT Subject: RE: GOA: Dole and S 735 (anti-gun provisions) To: Jeff Chan The following letter along with the Issues and Questions for Waco Hearings were sent to all Members of Congress on July 9, 1995. Please redistribute and repost this vital information. Thank you. Alan Gottlieb, Chairman, Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, (1-206-454-4911 or jhvg@saf.org) Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms 12500 N.E. Tenth Place, Bellevue, Washington 98005 206-454-4911 206-451-3959 (FAX) Dear Congressman/woman: We commend the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee on Crime for their decision to hold hearings to investigate the Waco Tragedy. We respectfully request that the attached questions be directed to witnesses at the joint hearings. The questions are divided into seven areas of concern, and include background information to further inform the committees. The questions are the result of extensive research into the events at Waco and are designed to reach the issue of possible violations by federal law enforcement of the constitutional and human rights of the residents of Mount Carmel. Thank you in advance for your careful consideration of these materials. Sincerely, John M. Snyder Director of Public Affairs Alan M. Gottlieb Chairman Issues and Questions for Waco Hearings Prepared by Nancy Ross and Deborah Green July 7, 1995 I. The Initial Search Warrant, Affidavit and Warrant Execution: Background: Many critics have contended that the affidavit filed by Special Agent Davy Aguilera in support of the search warrant issued to the ATF on February 25, 1993, to search the Mount Carmel Center, failed to establish probable cause, as required by the Fourth Amendment. The affidavit relied largely on hearsay evidence from informants whose credibility was questionable (they did not possess the technical expertise to identify the weapons they alleged were on the Mt. Carmel premises). Moreover, the information alleged in the affidavit was stale -- 8 months or more had elapsed since it was gathered. Many of the weapons and weapons parts alleged to be in the possession of Mt. Carmel residents were in fact unregulated weapons and parts, and thus their enumeration in the affidavit makes no sense, except as an attempt to mislead a magistrate. Finally, the warrant was overly broad, authorizing the search of the entire premises, including all the personal belongings of some 90 men, women and children besides the suspects, which included only David Koresh and one or two others. The Treasury Department's own review noted that the BATF "did not adequately pursue" alternative, less risky options for carrying out its mandate to serve the warrant, such as arresting Koresh when he was away from the compound. Treasury faulted the agency for failing "to establish an effective intelligence operation" which would have alerted agents to the fact that Koresh occasionally left Mt. Carmel, although other evidence suggests that it was widely known that Koresh frequently traveled outside the Center for routine purposes. Finally, Treasury was critical of the BATF for its failure to abort the February 28th raid after it was clear that they had lost the element of surprise and had been notified hours prior to the raid by the undercover agent who was in the Center the morning of the raid. Indeed the Treasury report led to the disciplining of several supervisory personnel, the resignation of the Director, and the suspension of two of the raid supervisors (who were ! later inexplicably reinstated with back pay). Some critics contend that these failures indicate systemic problems with the agency, its administration and chain of command, suggestive of an institutional preference for headline-grabbing, paramilitary assaults. The Treasury Department's official review failed to resolve many questions, including the question of who shot first. The ATF has maintained that their 76 member assault force was "ambushed" by the Branch Davidians. This is, as Dr. Alan Stone, a government-appointed outside expert, said, "a very misleading, distorted picture of what happened." Dr. Stone pointed out that, given the fire-power the Davidians supposedly had, and their advantageous tactical position surveying the surrounding flat plains on which the ATF forces were advancing, they could have inflicted much greater damage if that had been their intention. Koresh was unarmed as he opened the front door to meet the advancing ATF agents. He was shot and wounded, as was his father-in-law, Perry Jones, who later died. Jack Zimmerman, former Marine colonel and an attorney who was allowed to enter Mt. Carmel during the siege, testified at the subsequent trial that the spray pattern of bullet holes entered the right half of the double front door from outside, and no bullet holes went outward. An examination of this door might help resolve the question of who shot first, and whether the ATF shot first and "announced" themselves later. Federal agents insist that the right half of the door was destroyed in the April 19th fire; however, video footage exists which clearly shows the bullet damage to the door. QUESTIONS: 1. At a House Judiciary Committee hearing on April 28, 1993, BATF Director Stephen Higgins told Congress that his agency did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant as of December 1992, but did have it as of mid-February 1993. The only activity mentioned in the affidavit that took place in that intervening time was an undercover visit to Mt. Carmel by BATF agent Rodriquez, in which Koresh discussed the right to bear arms and showed him a gun magazine (which Agent Aguilera characterized as "clandestine" even though it has a subscription base of 165,000) and a videotape about alleged BATF abuses (also in wide public distribution). Does the BATF regard the exercise of protected speech as a predicate for criminal investigation, when that speech disagrees with the gun laws of the United States or is hostile to the BATF? 2. The affidavit refers tendentiously to the residents of Mt. Carmel as a "religious cult commune," and complains that David Koresh was "operating a commune type compound". Does the BATF regard certain religious practices as a predicate for criminal investigation in the areas of law enforcement under their jurisdiction -- taxes related to alcohol, tobacco and firearms, with sub-reference to guns, drugs and gangs? 3. Why does the affidavit repeat hearsay remarks concerning child abuse, an offense that is not under the jurisdiction of the ATF? 4. Why was the warrant sought to begin with, since David Koresh, on learning that he was being investigated by BATF, invited the ATF on July 30, 1992, through his gun dealer Henry McMahon, to come to his home to inspect his firearms? 5. Koresh had a history of cooperating with local law enforcement in the past, even allowing himself to be arrested. Given this history, why did the ATF choose to "serve" the warrant on Koresh by staging a "dynamic entry" raid involving 76 heavily armed agents? 6. Was the ATF's choice of the dynamic entry tactic influenced by upcoming congressional appropriations hearings just 10 days later on March 10, 1993 at which ATF officials were expected to justify their budgets? 7. How does ATF justify its disproportionate response to the purported danger Koresh posed: they assaulted a residence housing dozens of innocent women and children, with a raiding party of 76 heavily armed agents, in order to apprehend one man with no prior convictions, who was possibly guilty of purchasing illegal gun parts? 8. If the ATF believed its own story about the danger Koresh posed, why did the raiding party fail to provide for the availability of a doctor or dispensary to treat wounded agents? Is it standard operating procedure not to make provisions for medical or paramedical treatment for agents participating in a dangerous "dynamic entry" raid? 9. The search warrant required that agents of BATF knock and announce themselves as federal agents. Due to the loss of the element of surprise, the warrant was served as a "no-knock" warrant. Is this in accord with standard operating procedures of the Bureau and in accordance with federal and state laws? 10. Agents were drawn from several ATF offices in at least three states and trained for the raid. Did these ATF agents rehearse a scenario for possible service of a "knock-and-announce" warrant, or prepare for the possibility of a peaceful entry? 11. Is it true that agents actually forgot to bring the warrant on the day of the raid? 12. Is it true that Assistant United States Attorney Bill Johnston refused to support the issuance of search warrants unless the ATF planned for the "dynamic entry option"? 13. If surprise was crucial to the success of what the BATF deemed a dangerous mission, why did they conduct the raid in the daytime? Why were only minimal efforts made to keep the press away? 14. Why did BATF agents give a false emergency number to the Sheriff's office of McLennan County, making it difficult for state law enforcement officers to contact BATF? (The Sheriff was thus unable to report the frantic 911 calls he was receiving from Davidian member Wayne Martin, who was pleading with him to get the ATF to stop shooting because of the danger it posed to women and children in the residence.) 15. Why did the ATF use armor-piercing ammunition, which could easily penetrate the flimsy walls of Mt. Carmel, when assaulting a location known to be housing dozens of innocent women and small children? Is the issuance of armor-piercing and/or rapidly fragmenting ammunition standard for agents at all times or just for "dynamic entry" raid? If not, who made the decision to issue such ammunition for this particular raid? 16. Was "friendly fire" involved in any of the deaths or injuries to BATF agents in the February 28 raid? A bullet recovered from the wound of one of the agents was a 9mm hydroshock bullet that only the ATF was reported to be using on February 28th. 17. What happened to the video which the ATF claims proves that they were fired on first? 18. Why was the warrant sealed indefinitely, depriving the public of information contained in it during the entire time of the standoff? II. THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS: Background: Another area of possible law enforcement abuse in Waco was the government's use of military equipment and personnel in what was ostensibly a civilian law enforcement matter. Our democratic society has placed definite restrictions on involving the military in actions against our own citizens. There is reason to believe that these restrictions were relaxed in Waco, possibly illegally. Most disturbing are indications that ATF supervising agents Chojnacki and Sarabyn, as well as Agent Aguilera, lied about a supposed drug lab at Mt. Carmel in order to qualify for military assistance in carrying out the raid on Mt. Carmel. (In response to the designation of drug trafficking as a "national security threat," Congress has approved military assistance to civilian police involved in drug interdiction.) According to investigative reporter, James Pate, "In planning its raid against David Koresh and the Branch Davidians, the ATF requested and received extensive military assistance, most notably from the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina." BATF agents practiced for the February 28th raid at Fort Hood, Texas. Mr. Pate contends that Green Beret trainers wrote a specific assault scenario for the BATF and participated in rehearsals for that assault, in direct violation of their mission orders. Moreover, unauthorized subject matter -- Close Quarter Combat -- was taught to BATF agents "violating very specific policy prohibitions by Special Forces command, the Army and DOD." Mr. Pate obtained a copy of a memorandum discussing the raid plan written prior to the raid by Army Major Philip W. Lindley, where he warned that "the degree of [Army] involvement proposed [by ATF] crossed the [legal] line and exposed the [Special Forces trainers] to criminal as well as civil liability." The BATF's charge of a "drug nexus" convinced the Texas National Guard to permit three helicopters to be used in the February 28th raid. Texas law requires evidence of illegal drugs before its aircraft are made available to federal agents. These helicopters flew over the Mt. Carmel Center on the day of the raid. The Treasury Report states that helicopters got within 350 meters of the building, when they were fired upon and forced back. Branch Davidians (including one who served as a prosecution witness) allege, on the contrary, that agents in helicopters started firing at them as they arrived at the north side of the building, and continued to pass back and forth over the building, firing at will, for several minutes, killing at least three unarmed Davidians. Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman, attorneys who were allowed into the Mt. Carmel Center during the siege, insisted there was extensive evidence of such an attack. In early April, 1993, the New York Times reported, "both lawyers clearly believed that helicopters flying over the compound during the raid had fired into upper floors of the main building from above." At trial, Zimmerman, who is an Army colonel and Vietnam veteran, described eight or nine bullet holes coming into the ceiling of David Koresh's bedroom in the top floor of the four story tower. "You could see the sky through the roof. They appeared to be exit holes, and the wood was splintered downward. My conclusion was that they came from the sky." QUESTIONS: 1. Did BATF agents know that their "evidence" of a "methamphetamine lab" in Mt. Carmel was extremely stale? It had been built some time in 1986-67, before David Koresh took over, and was dismantled by Koresh (who also may have contacted local law enforcement about it). 2. If BATF had evidence of drug violations at Mt. Carmel, why didn't prosecutors introduce evidence of such violations during the trials of the surviving Branch Davidians? 3. Prior to the raid, the Texas National Guard conducted six flights over the Mt. Carmel Center, using infrared surveillance equipment that could indicate the presence of certain types of drug operations. What drug evidence, if any, was turned up by this investigation? Is there a record of the reports from such surveillance, including the date on which it was first authorized and the dates on which it was conducted? 4. While BATF asserted to the military that they had evidence of drug activity in Mt. Carmel, their affidavit supporting the search warrant of Mt. Carmel made absolutely no allegations about illegal drug activity. How does BATF explain this inconsistency? When was the drug question raised with federal and state military commanders and what documents supported these allegations? 5. According to journalist James Pate, a February 28th Army letter released under the Freedom of Information Act confirms that the Army was considering airborne gunfire. Did agents or military personnel shoot at Mt. Carmel from helicopters? 6. ATF agents, including raid commander SAC Philip Chojnacki, Ted Royster, Davy Aguilera, and others, were aboard the helicopters deployed to Mt. Carmel on February 28th. Were these agents, or any of the other ATF agents or National Guardsmen present on the aircraft, armed? 7. Were any Special Forces personnel present as observers on the ground or in the air during the February 28th ATF raid on Mt. Carmel? If so, what was their mission and who requested or ordered their presence? 8. Throughout the siege the FBI used military equipment: nine Bradley fighting vehicles, five combat engineering vehicles, one tank retrieval vehicle, and two Abrams tanks. Assuming it was legal for the FBI to use these vehicles for "safety" purposes, what was the legality of using them to assault the residents of Mt. Carmel? 9. Is it standard operating procedure for agents preparing for a "dynamic entry" raid to train with the military or on military installations? If not, what was special about the Mt. Carmel raid which required such tactical or weapons training? Who ordered it? 10. Did the military provide special training in the mixing and use of CS gas? If so, was this training in accord with standard training for chemical weapons which normally requires the operatives to experience, however briefly, dosing with the chemical agent? III. FBI's and ATF's Use of Consultants and Experts in Formulating an Approach to the Branch Davidians: Background: A frequent criticism of law enforcement actions in Waco is that they failed utterly to grasp that they were dealing with a high commitment religious group, rather than a traditional hostage situation. Dr. Gordon Melton, director of the Institute of American Religion, has stated "just as we would not call upon the Ku Klux Klan to offer expert testimony on African-Americans or the American Nazi Party to speak about Jews, so we should cease calling upon so-called 'cult experts', who have as their agenda the destruction of non-conventional religions, to provide testimony and information about religious groups." According to Dr. Nancy Ammerman, an independent expert charged by the DOJ to review the events at Waco, both the BATF and the FBI relied on the advice of self-styled "cult expert" Rick Ross, of the Cult Awareness Network (CAN), when deciding the course of action to be taken in regard to the Branch Davidians. CAN has a long history of intolerance and antagonism toward new, small, or non-mainstream religions, and has succeeded in popularizing the concept of "cult" as a derogatory label for religions they deem illegitimate. CAN-associated deprogrammers have carried out illegal, forcible and often violent kidnappings of people involved with groups of which CAN does not approve, and Mr. Ross himself has been the target of numerous legal challenges to his employment of these tactics. Nevertheless, Dr. Ammerman noted in her report that Ross "clearly had the most extensive access to both agencies of any person on the 'cult expert' list, and he was apparently listened to more att! entively." While listening attentively to an informant with no relevant credentials who had a clear ideological bias against the Branch Davidians, law enforcement gave short shift to, or actively undermined, tactical advice given by both reputable outside scholars of religion and their own behavioral experts, both of whom counseled law enforcement to take seriously the religious beliefs of the people in Mt. Carmel. For instance, Dr. James Tabor and Dr. Philip Arnold, experts competent to give advice on apocalyptical religions, had engaged David Koresh in an extended discussion of his beliefs, leading to Koresh's promise to exit Mt. Carmel upon his completion of an exegesis of a Biblical text. FBI agent Jeff Jamar first told Koresh's lawyer that he would be granted the time (estimated at two weeks) to finish the text. Before the two weeks elapsed, and with no provocation from Koresh, the FBI abandoned this peaceful plan and executed the April 19th raid. The FBI had earlier discounted the advice of its own behavioral experts, Peter Smerick and Mark Young, who counseled a cautious, non-confrontational approach to Koresh in four memos written from Waco to senior FBI officials between March 3 and 8, 1993. According to Mr. Smerick, FBI superiors pressured him to change his assessment, to justify more confrontational tactics. QUESTIONS: 1. How did it happen that a deprogrammer associated with the Cult Awareness Network, Rick Ross, (who himself had a criminal record) came to be the outside "expert" having the most extensive access to and influence upon the ATF and FBI, and was "listened to most attentively" by them? 2. Is it the practice of the FBI and the ATF to use consultants such as Rick Ross, with known ideological biases, and how does law enforcement evaluate information obtained from such consultants? Under normal circumstances? In the case of the Mt. Carmel raid? If the Mt. Carmel raid practices differed from standard procedure, why? And who made the decisions to alter standard policies and practices? 3. Was Mr. Ross a source of the allegations, later judged groundless, that there was widespread child abuse occurring in Mt. Carmel? 4. Did FBI executives pressure Mr. Smerick, the FBI's lead criminal analyst on the scene at Waco, to change his advice that law enforcement should decrease its pressure on Koresh? 5. Who advised the FBI to employ tactics of psychological warfare, such as cutting off water and electricity, blaring Tibetan chants, sounds of rabbits being slaughtered, dentist drills and rock music, shining flood lights, etc., against the residents of Mt. Carmel? Have such tactics been employed by the FBI in other situations, and, if so, in what other cases? And with what results? Who approved their use in this instance? 6. Was any consideration given to the impact of these tactics on children in Mt. Carmel? 7. Why were these tactics continued and escalated, even after the residents responded to negotiations by sending out groups of their members with their children? Dr. Robert Cancro, one of the government's independent experts, has remarked that this inconsistent strategy has "many features of a double bind," and moreover, departed from standard operating procedure. Why was a non-standard procedure adopted in this case? Who first recommended it? Who approved it? 8. The Branch Davidians defined themselves first and foremost as a religious community, and the overwhelming majority of Mt. Carmel residents, including its many children, were charged with no crime. Nevertheless, the FBI declined to seek advice from reputable scholars familiar with the religious beliefs and practices of the Branch Davidians in planning their response to the Mt. Carmel siege. Why did the FBI discount the religious beliefs of the Branch Davidians and fail to seek expert advice on how those beliefs would affect reactions to law enforcement? 9. In response to a question by Ted Kopel on Nightline (7/5) as to why the FBI didn't consult with theologians and religious scholars, Jeffrey Jamar stated that the FBI had consulted with all sorts of theologians and religious scholars. Which religious scholars did the FBI consult with, what was their academic background, and what was their advice? IV. ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE COMMITTED BY THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS: Background: Sensational allegations of child abuse among the Branch Davidians were promoted to the media by the Cult Awareness Network, and echoed by both Attorney General Janet Reno and President Clinton, who used the allegations to justify the final decision to end the standoff with tanks and CS gas. On the evening of the tragedy, Reno told talk show host Larry King, "We were concerned for the children because there had been reports of sexual abuse of the children." President Clinton asserted categorically that "we know that David Koresh had sex with children. I think that is undisputed." In its own official chronology of events, however, the Department of Justice admitted that the FBI had "no direct evidence establishing that any children were being either sexually or physically abused" during the standoff. Nor did they have "probable cause to indict" Koresh for child abuse for any period prior to the standoff, a fact confirmed by previous investigations of Koresh by the Texas Department of Regulatory Services. The unjustified allegations of child abuse undoubtedly contributed to the demonization of the Branch Davidians, and increased the likelihood that the public would accept law enforcement dealing summarily with them. Indeed, many official spokesmen for the government agencies who briefed the news media appear to have repeated these allegations after the assertions had been discredited. QUESTIONS: 1. Why did the affidavit filed by the ATF to obtain the search warrant include allegations of child abuse, a state offense over which the ATF has no jurisdiction? 2. Who misinformed Attorney General Reno that children were being sexually abused in Mt. Carmel? And why? What evidence did that official have that those assertions were accurate? 3. Who misinformed Attorney General Reno that babies were being beaten inside Mt. Carmel? Was that an individual decision to include such information in the briefing or was it a committee recommendation? When were these assertions first conveyed to the attorney general? 4. After the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton responded to a question by Leslie Stahl, by saying: ". . . some religious fanatics murdered themselves ... murdered their children." What evidence does the White House have that the Branch Davidians murdered their own children? And how does one account for the selective release of some children during the siege? V. The April 19th Raid: Background: The DOJ review of the events at Waco indicate that FBI officials actively lobbied Attorney General Reno to forcibly end the standoff. In reply to her question as to why this was necessary, she was told that "Koresh had broken every promise he had made; negotiations had broken down; no one had been released since March 23; and it appeared that no one else would surrender." A more objective review of the situation by outside experts such as Dr. Robert Cancro and Dr. Alan Stone, gives a different picture: negotiations had in fact achieved the exit of many people from Mt. Carmel, but the negotiators were undermined by tactical leadership, which insisted on employing punitive "psy-ops" tactics against the Davidians. In spite of these cruel measures, there was convincing evidence that the surrender of David Koresh was imminent at the time the FBI convinced Attorney General Reno to take the disastrous step of assaulting Mt. Carmel. On April 14th Koresh sent out a letter in which he declared that God finally had spoken to him and that all the Davidians would come out as soon as he had completed a short book on the Seven Seals. On April 16th, Koresh told the FBI he had finished the First Seal, the longest one. After receiving Koresh's April 14th promise to surrender, Koresh's attorney, Dick DeGuerin, had a face-to-face meeting with FBI agent Jeffrey Jamar, who promised DeGuerin the FBI would allow "all the time it takes" to finish the book, and certainly the two weeks DeGuerin estimated. While Koresh's attorney was being given these assurances, however, Supervisory Special Agent Byron Sage was advising the Attorney General's office that "further negotiations with the subjects in the co! mpound would be fruitless," and th at Koresh had been "disingenuous . . . about the Seven Seals," and that there "was nothing more he or the negotiators could do to persuade Koresh to release anyone else, or to come out himself." The FBI proposed, and the Attorney General approved, a plan calculated to force the occupants of Mt. Carmel out, first by gassing the building, and then dismantling it. If the tanks carrying out the gassing operation were met with gunfire, the plan called for the rules of engagement to change: deadly fire would be returned. Though they claimed the Davidians fired on the tanks, the FBI insists it never returned fire. They did, however, escalate the "breaching operation" -- tanks crashed down the walls, causing many Davidian fatalities, and possibly either starting or accelerating the fire that ultimately destroyed the building and killed most of the inhabitants. QUESTIONS: 1. Did the FBI willfully suppress or play-down Koresh's April 14th promise of surrender in their representations to Attorney General Reno? 2. Did the FBI tell Janet Reno that the 40 mm ferret liquid tear gas rounds would be delivered by M79 grenade launchers? When fired from 20 yards or less, these are capable of penetrating a hollow core door -- or killing a human being. 3. Why were there so few fire and safety precautions taken on April 19th? 4. Were any "flash-bangs" or pyrotechnic devices used at all in the course of the April 19th breaching and gassing operation? 5. FBI has asserted that fire-fighting equipment and personnel were kept away because Davidians were shooting. And yet news footage clearly shows agents walking about the site, apparently unconcerned about gunfire. How does the FBI explain this inconsistency? 6. Why did the FBI refuse last minute negotiations the day of the raid? Why did the FBI also prohibit press contact directly with the Davidians when they requested press access? Who decided to prevent such contact and why? The Davidians hung banners outside their windows, asking to have their phone reconnected. FBI refused, claiming it was not safe. To whom was it unsafe? Why? 7. DOJ reviewer Edward Dennis noted that around 11:20 a.m. there began "an apparent deviation from the approved plan" which had been that the building would only be dismantled if all the Davidians did not exit after 48 hours. However, at this time the tanks began demolishing the walls and roof of the gymnasium and crashing deeper into the building. Who ordered this change? 8. The FBI has explained the tank breaching operation in terms of trying to create openings for Davidians to exit. Were the agents on the ground completely unaware of the fact that collapsing walls and staircases were crushing people, or trapping them inside the building? VI: THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF CS GAS AGAINST THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS: Background: Using combat engineering vehicles (M-60 tanks with booms attached), federal agents crashed through the flimsy walls of the Mt. Carmel Center and pumped in CS gas. The stated goal of this operation was to "gradually make it increasingly uncomfortable inside the structure," forcing its occupants to come out and surrender. The DOJ review indicates that the FBI, in its advice to the Attorney General, failed to acknowledge the dangers of CS gas. It is hard to believe they were unaware of these dangers, given that information is readily available. CS gas was banned for military use at the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris in January 1993, which should be some indication of its capacity to cause extreme suffering. The United States is a signatory to this convention. Thus, while CS gas cannot be used against soldiers with whom the US is at war, it was approved by Attorney General Janet Reno for use against American civilians, including women and children. Aldrich Chemical, which manufactures CS gas, halted its sale to the Israeli Defense Forces after an Amnesty International report documented the CS-related deaths of 40 Palestinians, 18 of whom were infants. The manufacturer's specifications warn that CS gas should not be used in closed spaces. Dr. Alan Stone, a professor of psychiatry and law at Harvard University who served as an independent expert in reviewing federal handling of the Waco incidents, reported that an independent computer search of the medical literature showed that children who inhaled CS gas risked "fulminating chemical pneumonia and death." The Attorney General and her advisors were aware that there were no gas masks in Mt. Carmel small enough to protect the younger children. The original plan presented to the Attorney General by the FBI and approved by her, called for CS gas to be continuously pumped into the Mt. Carmel Center for 48 hours. QUESTIONS: 1. Why was the Attorney General not provided with the publicly available information on the extreme medical risks entailed by the use of CS gas? 2. Even assuming the Attorney General was unaware of the lethal danger of CS gas, what is the justification for planning to expose infants and children to any kind of chemical irritant for 48 hours? 3. How was this decision to expose children to CS gas consistent with stated motivation for the gas assault: to prevent the children in Mt. Carmel from further abuse? 4. Has CS gas been used in the US against civilians on other occasions, and what is known about the results of such use? 5. The military use of CS gas against enemies in battle requires an Executive Order signed by the president. Did the President sign an Executive Order for its use in Mt. Carmel, and who in the White House agreed to its use? 6. Is there any precedent, either in the US, or abroad, for using the vast quantities of CS gas that were deployed against the civilians at Mt. Carmel? (The FBI fired more than 400 canisters of the gas into the residence.) 7. The DOJ report indicates that Attorney General Reno inquired about the flammability of CS gas, and was told by her advisers that it was not flammable. Nevertheless, manufacturers specifications indicate that in the presence of relatively low heat the gas will break down and produce deadly carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide gases. Heat sufficient to trigger this breakdown is apparently generated through the normal process of firing of the gas, and that is why the gas should not be used in closed spaces. In fact, autopsies reveal that two thirds of the bodies examined contained these lethal gases. Why did the FBI fail to consider this contingency when they pressed Attorney General Reno for permission to go ahead with their plan? VII. FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT TO FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THE TRAGEDY OF WACO: Background: The DOJ review of law enforcement actions at Waco exonerated the Attorney General and everyone in the FBI. The Treasury's review of the BATF resulted in the resignation of the Director and the dismissal of two agents, both of whom have since been rehired. Evidence that would be useful in establishing government culpability, or in exonerating the Branch Davidians, has disappeared under questionable circumstances, or been tampered with. QUESTIONS: 1. There were more than 100 hours of FBI tapes from the compound which were reduced to an hour by the prosecution's audio expert. The FBI planted 11 audio surveillance devices inside FBI, and claimed that all malfunctioned at the same time, just five minutes before the fire started. About five minutes of tape from the FBI's FLIR video -- in the time frame leading up to the fire -- is also unaccounted for. Where are these tapes? 2. Who authorized the May 12th bulldozing of the Mt. Carmel site, destroying all evidence before independent arson investigators could inspect the grounds? 3. What happened to the right half of the front door? Recovery of the door would have provided evidence showing from which direction the shots were fired in the February 28th raid. BATF claims the door burned, however, the door was made of steel, and could not have burned. 4. Why did the FBI cut off the refrigeration at the morgue in Fort Worth without notice to relatives of those Davidians whose bodies were kept there? A wrongful death suit filed by Ramsey Clark on behalf of the families alleges that this action caused "remains of deceased church members to disintegrate." Who gave that order? And why? 5. Why was the evidence recovered from the Mt. Carmel site shipped to federal laboratories when the Texas Rangers were supposed to be in charge? 6. At the trial, a Texas Ranger said he turned over to the FBI a safe with $50,000 in cash, gold coins, platinum and other valuables. However, these items did not appear on the FBI evidence list. What happened to the safe? 7. Did the FBI make audio tapes of conversations between decision-makers inside the Washington FBI Operations Center on April 19th? 8. According to the DOJ report, the FBI Operations Center had a "live audio feed" from the FBI forward command post in Waco. Did this include everything audio taped by surveillance devices inside Mt. Carmel Center, the morning of the fire as it happened? How much could officials hear, and how did it affect their decisions? 9. Did the FBI make audio tapes of conversations between the tank drivers and HRT Commander Richard Rogers? If so, where are these tapes now? 10. Why did the FBI allow an investigator with a conflict of interest to lead the fire investigation team? The DOJ report asserts that Texas Rangers assembled a team of "independent" fire investigators to determine the cause of the fire. However, at the trial, the head of the Texas Rangers investigation testified that the US Attorney's office appointed Paul Gray to head the team. Paul Gray, the Assistant Chief of the Houston Fire Department, had served as a member of BATF's National Arson Response Team and taught classes for BATF agents. His wife was a secretary in BATF's Houston office. BATF officials recommended him for the job. 11. Who was left in charge in the DOJ command center when Attorney General Reno left to go to Baltimore at approximately 11 a.m. on April 19? 12. Was Larry Potts involved in the decision making process in the use of CS gas and in the final assault? 13. What was Deputy Attorney General Webster Hubbell's role? During the April 28, 1993 House Judiciary Committee hearing, Rep. Sensenbrenner questioned whether Hubbell had been having "out-of the loop discussions with President Clinton about the standoff." He could not get a definitive answer from Sessions or Reno about the content of those discussions. Attorney General Reno initially claimed that Hubbell had spoken to Clinton on April 19th, but this was denied in the DOJ report. 14 Why were BATF agents Chojnacki and Sarabyn rehired? The Treasury Report cited them for lying and altering documents in an attempt to divert blame to a junior undercover agent. 15. Immediately following the failure of the original Feb. 28th raid, official BATF spokespersons lied or at least contradicted themselves in days of interviews with the press in which they were supposedly informing the public of what was happening at Mt. Carmel. Later, the FBI took over the public information function. Was inaccurate public information the fault of the individuals speaking with the press or part of a policy decision made by supervisors? * For additional information or for questions, please call Ross & Green at: (202) 638-4858. [end]