[ftp://ftp.shell.portal.com/pub/chan/judicial/ct-aw.30jun94] [This file has 3 parts: Don's annoucement, Dranginis' decision, and the text of Connecticut's so-called "Assault Weapon" ban. The latter two were downloaded from the Forest of Shadows BBS & had line breaks and other minor editing done. Clearly the bans in CT, NJ and CA are ripe for a Supreme Court decision which, if it goes by law and precedent, we would win. -- Jeff C.] __ From: DonaldB484@aol.com To: chan@shell.portal.com Date: Sat, 02 Jul 94 22:55:17 EDT Subject: CT Gun Ban Upheld! Thursday, June 30, 1994, 14:19hrs, is a date which shall live in the hearts and minds of Connecticut gun owners for years to come. Judge Dranginis signed and issued her decision regarding CT gunonwner's challenge of PA 93-306, Ct Assualt Weapons Law. Her decision was a large blow for gunowners across the nation. Connecticut is the first state to pass a Assault Weapons Law that bans sales and ownership of semi-auto and selectfire weapons that has a strong state Consitutional provision protecting the rights of gun owners. "Article 1, Section 15, clearly defines this right... "Every man has the right to keep and bear arms in defense of himself and the state." This judge clearly rejected the concept of this basic right and ruled that this right was not absolute and can be "reasonably regulated" under the state's police powers. She must consider a BAN reasonable regulation! I would guess that she would feel that a wire tapping and recording all phone conversations of CT's citizen's without a warrant as reasonable regulation of the phone company! She avoided any detailed statements regarding the right to bear arms and stayed mainly with the emotional issues and stated in here statement that our withnesses where liars and bias and had no bearing or carried any weight with her. Upon reading her 42 page decision I think this judge has little concept of the law and our individual freedoms. Her disregard for equal protection and our right to bear arms leap from the pages. Our attorneys will be appealing this unfair and unconsitutional decision to a higher court with in a month. This fight is far from over. For anyone who would like a copy of the decision and the public act can acquire the files from our BBS, The Forest os Shadows 203-262-6111. These files can be found in the Sportsman's file area. There is not fee or charge for access. Those who can make file requests through Fidonet can request the directory and access them though the net, the address 1:141/520. Direct access is available 24 hours and up to 14.4 baud. TTFN Don. __ [This file came from the Forest of Shadows BBS. I inserted line breaks and I converted single and double quotes into 7-bit ASCII versions, but did not otherwise edit the text. I'm not aware of the source of the typos, whether they're in the original decision or are transcription errors. -- Jeff Chan] __ CV 93-006373 : SUPERIOR COURT : DEFOREST H, BENJAMIN, JR., : JUDICICAL DISTRICT OF ET AL : LITCHFIELD : V. : AT LITCHFIELD : JOHN M. BAILEY, ET AL. : JUNE 30, 1994 MEMORDANDUM OF DECISION The issue before the court is the constitutionality of 1993 Connecticut Public Act No. 93-306, Connecticut's "Assault Weapon Law." On June 8, 1993, after lengthy debate, the Connecticut legislature enacted P.A. 93-306 ("the Act").[footnote#1, Lt. Governor Eunice S. Groark provided the tiebreaking vote after an 18-18 vote in the Senate.] The Act became effective on October , 1993 and prohibits the sale, transfer, and possession of certain firearms and firearms parts collectively described as "assault weapons." Any person who lawfully possesses and "assault weapon" prior to October 1, 1993 can keep the weapon by obtaining a certificate of possession from the department of public safety. P.A. 93-306, Section 4(a). A person who violates the possession element of the Act, except for a first time offender who presents proof that he lawfully possessed the weapon before October 31, 1993, is guilty of a Class D felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which one year may not be suspended or reduced. P.A. 93-306, Section 3(a). A person who violates the sale or transfer element of the Act is guilty of a class C Felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years may not be suspended or reduced. P.A. 93-306 Section 2(a)(1). The Act further provides that a person who commits any class A,B, or C felony while armed with or threatening the use of an "assault weapon", shall be imprisoned for a term of eight years, which shall not be suspended or reduced. P.A. 93-306.Section 8. The Act specifies limited exceptions for certain individuals, such as police officers and members of the armed forces. P.A. 93-306, Section 3(b). Sec.1(a)(1) of the Act defines and "assault weapons." It states: As used in this act, "assault weapon" means: (1) Any selective-fire firearm capable of fully automatic, semi-automatic or burst fire at the option of the user or any of the following specified semi-automatic firearms: Algimec Agmi; Armalite AR-180; Australian Automatic Arms SAP Pistol; Auto-Ordnance Thompson type; Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 type; Barrett Light-Fifty model 82Al; Beretta AR-70; Bushmaster Auto Rifle and Auto Pistol; Calico models M-900, M-950 and l00-P; Chartered Industries of Singapore SR-88; Colt AR-15 and Sporter; Daewoo K-l, K-2, Max-l and Max-2; Encom MK-IV, MP-9 and MP-45; Fabrique Nationale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, or FN/FNC; FAMAS MAS 223; Feather AT-9 and Mini-AT; Federal XC-900 and XC-450; Franchi SPAS-12 and LAW-12; Galil AR and ARM; Goncz High-Tech Carbine and High-Tech Long Pistol; Heckler & Koch HK-91, HK-93, HK-94 and SP-89; Holmes MP-83; MAC-10, MAC-11 and MAC-11 Carbine type; Intratec TEC-9 and Scorpion; Iver Johnson Enforcer model 3000; Ruger Mini-14/5F folding stock model only; Scarab Skorpion; SIG 57 AMT and 500 series; Spectre Auto Carbine and Auto Pistol; Springfield Armory BM59, SAR-48 and G-3; Sterling MK-6 and MK-7; Steyr AUG; Street Sweeper and Striker 12 revolving cylinder shotguns; USAS-12; UZI Carbine, Mini-Carbine and Pistol; Weaver Arms Nighthawk; Wilkinson "Linda" Pistol. P.A. 93-306 Section 1(a)(1). The plaintiffs in the present action are DeForest Benjamin, a gun dealer and gunsmith in the town of Cornwall; Robert Suprenant, a citizen of Colebrook who wishes to purchase a Colt Sporter; Bertcelis Morales, a resident of Bridgeport and owner of an Intratec TEC DC-9; Michelle and Bradford Palmer, residents of Manchester who allege that Michelle is the owner of a single Colt Sporter and pursuant to the Act, she can not shoot with her father; Bruce Kaufman, a resident of Windsor and owner of a Colt AR-15; Frank D'Andrea, a firearms dealer in Stratford; and Navegar Inc., d/b/a Intratec, a Florida corporation which manufacturers the Intratec TEC-9 and Scorpion. The defendants are John M. Bailey, the Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut; Frank Maco, the State's Attorney for the Judicial District of Litchfield; and Nicholas Cioffi, the Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Connecticut. On October 12, 1993, the Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and, eventually filed an amendment to their amended complaint. In their amended complaint, which contains five counts, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Act is void under the Connecticut Constitution. The plaintiffs also seek to enjoin the enforcement of the Act pending the resolution of the case. The plaintiffs allege in counts one and tow that the Act violates their constitutional rights to equal protection and due process under the Connecticut Constitution. Count three states that the Act is void for vagueness. In count four, the plaintiffs allege that the Act is unconstitutional because it attains specific manufacturers who make particular weapons while not similarly affecting other manufacturers who make "similar, identical, or functionally identical" weapons. Count five states that the Act infringes on the plaintiffs' right to bear arms under Article First, Section 15 of the Connecticut Constitution. I. FACTS The court, conducted an evidentiary hearing on divers days between January 20, 1994 and February 1, 1994. Thereafter, post-trail briefs were filed, and both counsel have made subsequent submissions with respect to recently decided case law, affecting the issues presented herein. Final argument was heard on March 2, 1994. The following plaintiffs testified. Michelle Palmer, a petite woman, who explained that she preferred to competitively with her father using Colt Sporter, made no claim in her testimony that she used the firearm in self-defense. Her claimed injury was that she was prevented by this statute from using her firearm of choice, one which was comfortable for a person of her body size, and one with which she could enter specific competitions. The impact of the legislation did not extinguish her right to bear arms, but compromised it to the extent that she claimed injury. Robert Suprenant testified that he desires to purchase a Colt Sporter. On cross-examination, he was asked if that was the only gun he wanted to buy. Bruce Kaufman used his Colt AR-15 to scare away an intruder in September of 1982. The intruder was never apprehended. Mr. Kaufman testified that he collected military style weapons, and had a collection valued at over One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars, which he and his father used in a gun dealing business. Mr. Kaufman's interest in the litigation was clearly as a dealer, and his claim that the AR-15 was necessary for the defense of his mother,his home, and himself, was incidental to his other real pursuit. DeForest Benlamin makes his living as a gunsmith and dealer. He testified that the Act had adversely affected his business, although there was absolutely no proof of that absent from his statement. He testified further that he often often reconstructed firearms, and that he was unclear from the statutes, as to which alterations he would now be allowed to make. He testified that he was confused about his ability to use a folding stock on some of the weapons. For a gunsmith, he appeared to be confused over very simple gun parts. His confusion was not credible to the court. Frank D'Andrea is a gun dealer, and has been so employed for over twenty years. He expressed confusion over whether he was permitted under the statute to sell certain firearms. He understood that he could not sell the listed firearms, but others were so similar that he he felt he might offend the statute if did engage in a practice of selling those firearms. He indicated that thirty (30%) percent of his stock was in assault weapons. He testified that he did not recall an individual named Rubin Calazzo entering his store and buying several firearms, for cash, for an individual named Danny Melendez, who was later convicted in the Federal District Court for illegal sale of firearms. He testified that he sold ammunition at a discount if purchased in large quantities. He further testified that large capacity magazines were a very saleable commodity for gun dealers. Mr. D'Andrea's interest in this litigation clearly stemmed form his economic interest, The subject firearms, he conceded, could be sold out side the State of Connecticut. Ms. Morales acquired an Intratec DC-9 from her husband just prior to the passage of the statute under review. She claimed that she possessed the firearm to protect herself, her family, and her home. She claimed that she heard an intruder at her front door in December, and that she had the gun. She also testified that she did not confront the intruder, or call out that she has a firearm. She testified that she turned on the porch light, and the intruder fled. She testified further that she only tried shooting the banned weapon twice, at close range, and more importantly, that she had never possessed or fired any other weapon before. The court finds her claim of a possessory interest in this banned weapon unworthy of belief. Carl Miguel Garcia, president of Navegar, Inc., the manufacturer of the Intratec-9 and DC-9, and Scorpion, testified that to his knowledge, both New Jersey and California had passed laws banning the sale or transfer of his listed weapons. Mr. Garcia complained that the statute had had a serious economic impact on his business, and that he and his company had received much negative press concerning the listed firearms. He indicated that they functioned in many ways like unlisted pistols and revolvers, and in fact used a generic magazine, similar to those used in Glocks, the firearm of choice of many police departments around the country. On cross-examination, Mr. Garcia admitted that his revenues had steadily increased over the past three years, despite the bans in some states, He agreed that the promotional literature contained slogans such as "easily concealed" and "tough as your toughest customer." No police departments utilize these products because they do not contain safeties. He agreed that the listed firearms were designed for maximum firepower, were inexpensive, and capable of rapid fire. Mr. Garcia claimed that the weapon could not be concealed, but upon cross-examination, the Attorney General demonstrated that, with a large magazine, the weapon, could in fact be concealed. Mr. Garcia denied that his listed firearms were the "gun of choice of drug dealers." Mr. Robert Reese, president of Springfield Armory, Inc., testified that he founded his company after the government arsenal at Springfield, Illinois was shut down in 1969. Mr. Reese acquired much of the machinery from the arsenal. He adopted that name, and testified that he spent five (5) years acquiring the right to use the name for his company. His story of developing his company, and the historical perspective of the World War II Garand was of interest to the court. After World War II, the NATO forces contracted with the Italian company, Baretta, to overhaul the Garand, and it became known as the Baretta modification, 1959, or BM-59. In 1979, Mr. Reese negotiated with Beratta to acquire forty tons of surplus parts from which the private Springfield Armory built it's BM-59. Mr. Reese and his company developed military weapons for civilian use and collection, and identified Plaintiff;s exhibits 45-58 as by-products of the United States M-1 Garand from the government Springfield Armory. He pointed to the similarities in the Baretta Garand M-1, the BM-59 Italia, to the banned Springfield Armory BM-59. On cross-examination, he testified that the BM-59 was a readily identifiable firearm, and that it was capable of firing .30 calibre "powerful" cartridges which could pierce five to six walls in a house. The firearm with that calibre cartridge could hit and kill a person distant from the shooter. the firearm was capable of firing four hundred (400) rounds of ammunition per minute, and a "good" shooter, could reload a magazine in ten seconds. Charles Fagg was qualified as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. In addition to identifying the banned firearms, he led the plaintiffs through a descriptions of similar, and yet not banned firearms, that were distinguishable by brand name and slight design differences, There seemed to be little controversy in this litigation that there are copies of the banned firearms, either by companies in foreign countries, or in this country, and that the industry markets firearms by changing numerical designation, name, and accessories. Mr. Reese testified that the industry had little control over the changes in designation of firearms, and that those changes appeared for each new marketing cycle. It appears that specific designation even within the industry may be an unattainable goal. Mr. Fagg testified that flash suppressors had legitimate civilian, and non-criminal purpose. Hunting at dawn or dusk made that a desired option for many hunters. He agreed that flash suppressor also had the ability to mask the position of the shooter, and control recoil to a certain extent upon rapid fire at a target. He conceded that the civilian use of those options was limited, but that those options might well be more important to criminal use. On cross-examination, he was able to testify as to the maximum magazine that the listed firearms could hold, at least in most instances. In testimony that was a bit too coy, he testified that he did not know what an Algimec Agmi, the first on the list of banned weapons, was. It was clear later that this was an Algimec AGM-1, so the statute contained a mere typographical error. [footnote#2, The court finds that the legislature should correct this typographical error.] The little "mystery" that surrounded that particular firearm, which no witness has ever seen, was somewhat unnecessary for a court trial. Mr. Fagg's testimony was technical and unemotional. He described certain features of firearms for the record. He compared the banned weapons with other not mentioned in the statute, and responded to questions on cross-examination in an equally professional manner. As earlier noted, there seemed to be little contest with respect to his description of the firearms brought into the court room, photographs of which remain as exhibits for review. It is clear that there are many firearms which fit the general designation of "assault weapons", and which are virtually identical to the banned weapons, but which do not appear on the list. Professor Kleck was called as an expert witness by the plaintiffs. His testimony centered on the self-defense capabilities of semi-automatic weapons. His testimony was biased and did not help the inquiry of the court in respect to the legal claims. His testimony focused on the public debate, which will continue on the airwaves, the town greens, and in the legislatures. This court is not permitted to substitute the judgment of the legislature, only to assess the claims of the parties. The decision of this court, and the decision on the appeal, will only be another step in the public dialogue concerning this issue. The statistics proposed were countered by the defendants, and the court was not swayed by either. The defendants offered a videotape of various firearms being fired at the State Police range. Automatic fire, selective fire, semiautomatic fire, and bolt action fire were described. (Defendants' Ex.14) During the testimony of Chief Thomas Sweeny of the Bridgeport Police Department, a video tape was offered (Defendants' Ex 3) of street life in Bridgeport on November 27, 1993, at Hallock and Shelton Streets from 11:25 p.m. - 12:13 a.m. on November 28. The Green top Posse had been raided and within a short time, was rearmed with assault-type weapons. The raid had secured two loaded AK-47s and a Colt Sporter with a flash suppressor,among other firearms. The Chief testified that "straw purchasers" would acquire he guns legally and then transfer then illegally. The Chief testified further concerning gang hits near a school, on the first day of school, when a new middle school was being opened, when children going to school had to walk past a crime scene. At that crime scene, seventy-six (76) bullet casings were found near the body of Alexander Aponte, a suspected gang member. Chief Sweeny pointed to the increase in seizure of assault weapons, In 1991, twenty-eight of the weapons seized as a result of police activity were assault weapons, and in 1992, that number increased to 49. While the evidence is clear that assault weapons do not make up the majority of weapons seizures, their numbers are increasing at a steady rate. He also described assaults on police officers, which included the use of an Intratec 22, one an M-11 type, and a crime scene which included Seven Hundred Sixty-two (762) spent rounds of 9mm ammunition. That police officer was struck with a 9mm round. Annette Richardson was killed, and it appeared from the investigation that she was not an intended victim. The Chief cited further examples of over penetration in dense population areas, which create a grave risk to the citizenry. He claimed further that the possession of guns in the home for self-protection gave the homeowner a false sense of security and posed a risk to members of he household. Col. Leonard Supenski is the Chief of the Technical Bureau of the Baltimore County Police Department. He is a gun owner and has competed with firearms as sport. He conducts training courses for police and citizens interested in self defense, He testified that he is familiar with the term "assault weapon" and opined that these armies could move more effectively. He stated that the Kalishnikov, AK-47, originally made in the U.S.S.R. in 1947 by Kalishnikov, was the precursor of all the military-style weapons on the list. His opinion was that there was not legitimate civilian use for these weapons, and that in a compressed urbanized society, they constituted a hazard to bystanders. Col. Supenski testified about the report and recommendations of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF") (Defendants' Ex 12) and provided the information contrary to Professor Kleck's testimony. He felt that the ordinarily intelligent citizen could access documents necessary to sufficiently warn that citizen of which weapons were banned. He mentioned SHOOTING DIGEST and GUNWORLD. The plaintiffs later offered into evidence, the manual published by the State of California to assist citizens in recognizing their banned firearms. (Plaintiffs's Ex. 67). He testified concerning the BATF's tracing of firearms seized by law enforcement, and indicated that the Intratec TEC 9 was the leading gun seized,and the combination of the Tec 9, the Cobra MAC-11, the AK-47, and the Colt AR-15 comprised thirty-seven (37%) percent of all assault weapons seized, Among characterizations of individuals from whom such weapons were seized were drug dealers, disturbed individuals, street gangs, and hate groups. He reiterated Chief Sweeny that most of these weapons are purchased legally and then come onto a secondary market of unregulated sales by straw purchasers selling to criminals. He insisted that these weapons were a serious risk to police officers and the public safety. On cross examination, he conceded that a semi-automatic rifle or handgun could be used defensively. He added that the use would require considerable training. He conceded some discrepancies from his deposition testimony. Major John Bardelli of the Connecticut State Police testified concerning the investigations of the murder of Trooper Russell Bagshaw by a burglar using the Wilkinson "Linda", a firearm on the list. He testified that the public safety is affected adversely by the named weapons, in that they pose a danger to police officers. he testified that urban undercover officers are encountering these weapons more and more, the Colt AR-15 is issued to the Connecticut State Police SWAT team, but is not standard issue. There is required special equipment and training for that Team. II DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT "the purpose of the a declaratory judgment action... is to 'secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties.'" (Citation omitted.) WILSON V. KELLY, 224 Conn.110, 115,517 a.2d 433 (1992). the declaratory procedure is peculiarly well adapted to the judicial determination of controversies concerning constitutional rights and, as in this case, the constitutionality of state legislative action. HORTON V MESKILL, 172 Conn.615, 626, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). "The statute authorizing the Superior Court to render declaratory judgments is as broad as it well could be made." SIGAL V. WISE, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A.891 (1932). "The declaratory judgment procedure may be employed in a justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement, and where all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof." Practice Book Section 390. The jurisdiction of the trail court over declaratory judgment actions depends upon compliance with the notice requirement of Practice Book Section 390. SERRANI V. BOARD OF ETHICS, 225 Conn, 305, 308, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993). Failure to comply with the notice requirement of Practice Book Section 390 deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdictions to render a declaratory judgment. See, e.g. CONNECTICUT INS. GUARANTY ASSN. V. RAYMARK CORPORATION, 215 Conn. 224, 229, 575 A2d 693 (1990). Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs have complied with the procedural requirements of a declaratory judgment action. All persons having an interest in the subject matter of this action are now parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW "Ordinarily, a trial court's analysis of a constitutional attack on an otherwise on an other wise validly enacted statute begins with certain underlying principles of statutory construction. "STATE V. LEARY, 41 Conn. Sup. 525, 526-27, 590 A.2d 494 (1991, Mottolese, J.) One of the most fundamental of these is "that a strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to acts of a legislature." (Citations omitted.) PECK V. JACQUEMIN, 196 Conn. 53, 64, 491 A2d 1043 (1985). To over come this presumption, the party attacking a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and the court will indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality. STATE V. BRETON, 212 Conn. 258, 269, 652 A2d 1060 (1989). "In choosing between two constructions of a statute, one valid and one constitutionality precarious, we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature's underlying intent..." (Citations omitted.) Id. IV EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS COUNTS 1,2 & 5 The plaintiffs rely solely on the state constitutional grounds to validate the Act. The court is not bound by federal precedents in interpreting our own state constitutional provisions. STATE V. GEISLER,222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A2.d 1225 (1992). "it is well established that federal constitutional... law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights..." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) STATE V. MILLER, 227 Conn. 363, 377-87, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993). "[F]ederal decisional law is not a lid on the protections guaranteed under our state constitution." DOE V. MAHER, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 419, 515, A.2d 134 (1986). Nevertheless, in the interpretation of our state constitution, the court is not precluded from consulting the case law under the federal constitution. DALY V. DELPONTE, 225 Conn. 499, 512-13, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). Article 1 Section 20 of the Connecticut Constitution is the modern equal protection clause. It provide: "no person shall be denied protection clause. it provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability." Conn. Const. Art. 1, Sec.20. The equal protection clause provides for varying levels of judicial review to determine whether a state statute passes constitutional muster. DALY V. DELPONTE, supra, 513. Our Supreme Court has held, in accordance with federal framework of analysis that state action concerning social and economic regulation will survive an equal protection challenge if it satisfies a rational basis test. Id. citing LADEN V. WARDEN, 169 Conn. 540, 542-43, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975). If, however, state action invidiously discriminates against a suspect class or affects a fundamental right, the action passes constitutional muster under the state constitution only if it survives strict scrutiny, See., 542. The plaintiffs allege in count one of their complaint that the Act must be declared unconstitutional because it lacks a rational basis. In count two, the plaintiffs allege that the Act should be "strictly scrutinized." The plaintiffs do not claim that the Act should be subject to a strict scrutiny test because it discriminates against a suspect class. Rather, the plaintiffs allege that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right and therefore legislation which affects that right should be subject to strict scrutiny. A. THE REASONABLENESS TEST The Connecticut Constitution, Article First, Section 15 states: "[e]very citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state." Conn. Const. Art. I, Sec.15. All constitutional rights however, are not absolute. For example, Conn. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3 guarantees the free exercise and enjoyment of religion. However, it is well recognized that this right is not absolute, religious conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. CANTWELL V. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04, 60 S.Ct.900, 84 L.Ed 1213 (1940). Further, the protection of speech found in the First Amendment and Conn. Const. Art. I Sec.4, while fundamental, is not absolute. The First Amendment does not protect one who yells "fire" in crowded theater, nor does it protect one who speaks "fighting words." CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed.2d 10331 (1942). Another example can be found in Conn, Const. Art. I, Section 8 which guarantees, in pertinent part, that in all criminal prosections, the accused shall have the right to be heard "...by himself and by counsel..." However, once a defendant is supplied with counsel, the core rights is exhausted, and additional protections claimed under the Sixth Amendment can be severely circumscribed. WHEAT V. UNITED STATES, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.ed.2d 140 (1988). As a result, defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel of choice where other societal interests are compromised. Id.; UNITED STATES V. VASQUEZ, 966 F.2d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1992); JOHNSON V. WARDEN, 218 Conn, 778, 790-91, 591 A.2d 399 (1991). On each occasion That the Connecticut courts have addressed the meaning of the "right to bear arms" provision, they have indicated that the right is not absolute, but is a limited right, subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power. STATE V. BAILEY, 209 Conn. 322, 346, 551, A.2d 1206 (1988); STATE V. BANTA, 15 Conn. App. 161, 184, 544 A.2d 1226 (1988); RABBIT V. LEONARD, 36 Conn. Sup. 108, 116, 413 A.2d 489 (1979); JOHNSEY V. BOARD OF FIREARMS PERMIT EXAM., superior Court, J.D. of New Haven, Docket #299478 (1991, Schaller, J.) (it was not unreasonable for the Board of Firearms Permit Examiners to conclude that the appellant was an unsuitable person to be granted a pistol permit.) In BAILEY, the court held, inter alia, that the requirements that a person obtain a permit to carry a pistol places a reasonable restriction on a citizen's right to bear arms. The court, in pertinent part, stated, "It is beyond serious dispute that the legislature had the authority to place reasonable restrictions on a citizen's right to bear arms." STATE V. BAILEY, supra, 346. In BANTA, the court denied the defendant's claim that statute which prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm was unconstitutional under the state constitution, The court stated: "... our limited review of the record in this case convinces us that the defendant's claims are truly of constitutional dimension. He claims that the state constitutional provision regarding the right to bear arms; Conn. Const., Art. I, se. 15; confers on him an individual right to possess a pistol. Even if we assume without deciding that there is such an individual constitutional right, similar constitutional provisions in other states have been repeatedly interpreted to be subject to reasonable limitation.... The defendant has not established that this prohibition applicable to convicted felons is unreasonable. (Citations omitted.) STATE V. BANTA, supra, 184. In RABBIT, the plaintiff complained of the revocation of his pistol permit without prior notice and an opportunity to heard. the court, Saden, J.,stated that a Connecticut citizen has a fundamental right to bear arms in self defense. RABBIT V. LEONARD, supra, 112. Nevertheless, the court applied a standard of reasonableness in finding that the state had the right to revoke the plaintiff;s pistol permit. Id., 116. Other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms have consistently held that the right to bear arms is not an unlimited right and is subject to reasonable regulation. [footnote #3 These states have right to bear arms provisions which focus on a citizens right to bear arms for self defense and defense of the state.] See, e.g. PEOPLE V. BROWN, 253 mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (1931); CARFIELD V. STATE, 649 P.2d 865, 871-72 (Wyo. 1982); PEOPLE V. BLUE, 190 Colo. 95, 102-03, 544 P.2d 385 (1975); ROBERTSON, ET AL. V. CITY OF DENVER, ET AL., Colo. (May 2, 1994); STATE V. CARTWRIGHT,246 Or.120, 134-36, 418 P.2d 822 (1966); STATE V. SMITH, 132 N.H. 756, 571 A.2d 179, 281 (1990); STATE V. KESSLER, 289 Or. 359, 614 p.2d 94, 99 (1980). In the recently decided ROBERTSON case, supra, the majority refused to categorize the Colorado right to bear arms as fundamental, but remained silent on that issue. They applied the reasonableness standard to the constitutional test of the Denver ordinance banning assault weapons. They cited the body of law that exists in Colorado where courts have applied the reasonableness standard to any statute which invoked the police power as a restriction on the right to bear arms, without a determination as to the nature of that right. ROBERTSON V. CITY OF DENVER, supra, 13-14. They point out that Connecticut is one of two jurisdictions to refer to the right as fundamental, citing RABBIT, supra. Id., 12. that decision of our court was handed down in 1979, and consistently since that time, the Connecticut Supreme Court has applied the reasonableness standard to any legislation that has regulated the right to bear arms. For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Conn. Const. Art. I Sec.15 explicitly grants citizens of Connecticut a right to bear arms. However, it does not grant an unlimited right to possess assault weapons. Therefore, the proper constitutional test is whether the Act is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. Police power generally means the power to govern and belongs to every sovereignty. SNYDER V. NEWTON, 147 Conn. 374, 389, 161 A.2d 770 (1960). "It is a universally accepted rule of constitutional law that the legislative department in the use of it's police power is the judge, within reasonable limits, of what the public welfare requires." (Citations omitted.) CUTLIP V. CONNECTICUT MOTOR VEHICLES COMMISSIONER, 168 conn. 94, 100, 357 A.2d 918 (1975). "The court's function in examining the constitutional aspect of police legislation is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in fair and reasonable way. If an enactment meets this test, it satisfies the constitutional requirement of due process and equal protection of the laws... courts cannot question the wisdom of police legislation and must accord to the legislature a liberal discretion, especially in matters involving potentialities generally recognized as dangerous. PIERCE V. ALBANESE, 144 Conn. 241, 249, 149 A.2d 606 (1957). All of the acts that have been received on this record were contained in the public debate in the legislature concerning the appropriateness, as a political matter, of regulating firearms in any way. The legislature focused on the perceived public need to control the use of large capacity, rapid fire automatic, selective fire, and some semiautomatic firearms. The evidence indicates an escalation in that use, and while not the predominant number of firearms seized, the banned weapons have appeared more frequently as a risk factor to police officers on the street, and to innocent victims in densely-populated areas. The court finds that Public Act 93-306 is a reasonable exercise of the State's police power. The court finds further that the legislature designed the Act to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable manner. Accordingly, it satisfies the constitutional requirement of due process and equal protection. V. VOID FOR VAGUENESS (COUNT 3) In count three of their amended complaint, the plaintiffs assert that the Act is unconstitutionally vague in violation of Article I, Sec. 10 of the Connecticut Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs attack Section 1(a) (1) of the Act which defined an "assault weapon". The void for vagueness doctrine, which is derived from the constitutional guarantee of due process, embodies two central precepts: statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. STATE V. SCHRIVER, 207 Conn, 456, 460, 542 A.2d 686 (1988); SMITH V. GOQUEN,415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed. 2d 605 (1974); STATE MANAGEMENT ASSN. OF CONNECTICUT V. O'NEILL, 204 Conn. 746, 757, 529 A.2d 1276 (1987). As a matter of the due process of the law requires by our federal and state constitutions, "a penal statute must be sufficiently definite to enable a person to know what conduct he must avoid." (Citations omitted.) STATE V. PROTO, 203 Conn. 682, 696, 526 A.2d 1297 (1987). Legislatures must set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcements officials and triers of the fact in order to prevent "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. "SMITH V. GOGUEN,supra, 572-73. A statute must afford a person of ordinary intelligence as reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited. MACKINNEY V. COVENTRY, 176 Conn. 613, 618, 410 A.2d 453 (1979). A statute which forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violate the first essential of due process of the law. STATE V. CAVALLO, 200 Conn. 664, 667, 513 A.2d 646 (1986). It is not necessary, however, that a statute list the precise conduct prohibited or required. STATE V. EASON, 192 Conn. 37, 47, 470 A.2d 688 (1984). It is recognized that the law may be general in nature; the constitution requires no more than" a reasonableness of certainty." STATE V. WHITE, 204 Conn. 410, 415, 528 A.2d 811 (1987). "The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." (Citation omitted.) Id., 415-16. "A statute is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor of its validity." (Citation omitted.) STATE MANAGEMENT ASSN. OF CONNECTICUT, INC. V. O'NEILL, supra, 758. Where a penal statute implicates rights protected by First Amendment, the statute's constitutionality is tested for vagueness on it's face. STATE V. PICKERING, 180 Conn. 54, 58 n.3, 428 A.2d 322 (1980). However, in nonFirst Amendment contexts, "the constitutionality of a statutory provision being attacked as void for vagueness is determined by the statutes's applicability to the particular facts at issue. " Id., 57. This case does not involve the alleged infringement of First Amendment freedoms, therefore, the plaintiffs' vagueness challenge must be examined in the light of the facts of this case. Hence, the court is not free to speculate as to whether under hypothetical circumstances, the Act may be vague. SPRINGFIELD ARMORY, INC. V. CITY OF COLUMBUS, 805 F. Supp. 489, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1992). The plaintiffs contend that the Act unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define "assault weapon" in term of any understandable categories except for the selective guns which are listed. The plaintiffs allege further that the ACT neglects to define "type" and "series" words which the Act uses to define assault weapons. The definition of "assault weapons" in the statute is clear. This court does not find credible, any claim that a person purchasing a firearm would be aware of it's firing capabilities. This court finds that person of ordinary intelligence is capable of understanding whether his or her firearm is a fully automatic, selective-fire, burst fire, or semi-automatic firearm. The definition of "assault weapon" is not vague. The plaintiffs cite STATE V. DEFRANCESCO, 34 Conn. App. 741, __ A.2d __ (1994), in support of their claim that "series" and "type" are not terms of art in the firearms industry, or at law, sufficient to allow the public to understand the prohibition in the statute. Colt, in it' promotional catalogue (Plaintiffs' Ex. 2) refers to certain combinations of firearms as a "group". Springfield Armory refers to "series" or "models" for groupings of similar firearms (Plaintiffs' Ex.3), while Eagle Arms prints an entire catalogue for the EA-15 series. This marketing literature is found to be readily available to the general public, to those of ordinary intelligence, who would likely review catalogues prior to making a purchase. Clearly, gun dealers who have such literature and knowledge of the industry, know when a firearm is derived from another, with certain alterations that do not change the essential form of the firearm. Therefore, the court finds that the use of the word "series" in the statute is not vague. The term "type" appears in none of the marketing or promotional literature that has bee made an exhibit for the record. Furthermore, the definition does not appear in Black's Law Dictionary, but only in Webster's. It is not a word that lends itself to statutory construction, absent a review of the legislative history. When the court is unable to find the legislative intent from the language of the statute, the court must look to the legislative history for guidance. see STATE V. DEFRANCESCO, supra, 750 The legislative history discloses that the word "type" was used in conjunction with AK-47 to include all copies of that firearm. SENATE PRCEEDINGS, PP. 2988 (May 27, 1993, Jepsen, S.). However, the legislative history is silent with respect to the use of the word "type" as it pertains to the Auto Ordnance Thompson type. Despite the legislative history which addresses the use of the word "type" in conjunction with the AK-47, the court finds that the use of the word "type" in this statute is vague. That finding, however, is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the entire statutue. "Whenever a portion of a statute appears to be void for vagueness on it's face, thereby threatening to produce a chilling effect on the remainder of the statute which might otherwise be valid, Connecticut courts, like the federal courts, have whenever possible, applied a 'judicial gloss' to the statute to save it from infection and inevitable invalidation. STATE V. LEARY, 41 Conn. Sup. 525, 526-27, 590 A.2d 494 (1991, Mottolese, J.). The court must now determine if the statute can be read consistently with its intent, if the vague word is deleted. The invalidity of one provision of the act does not necessarily result in the entire act being invalid. KELLEMS V. BROWN, 163 Conn. 478, 495-96, 313 A.2d 53 (1972); citing STATE V. WHEELER, 25 Comm. 290, 299 (1856). The test is whether they are so mutually connected and dependent as to indicate a legislative intent that they should stand or fall together. KELLEMS V. BROWN, supra, citing BRANCH V. LEWWEENZ, 75 Con. 319,324, 52A. 658 (1902). In this case, the court finds no such dependence, and no mutual connection with respect to the list of firearms, and with the respect to the AK-47. However, the use of the word "type" following Auto Ordnance Thompson is connected, and that designation is subject to being void for vagueness. Auto Ordnance Corporation makes a variety of pistols and long guns which are not further described in the statute. (Plaintiffs' Ex.1). Deleting the word "type" from the description does not cure the problem with vagueness for this listing. If the legislature sees fit, it has the option to revise the statute to deal with which of the Auto Ordnance firearms they feel are subject to the statute. At this time, the court has no ability or authority to substitute it's judgment. The excision of the "type" where noted will not defeat the statute, nor prevent it's reasonable use as dictated by the legislature. By narrowing the construction of the statute, by deleting the vague term "type" and "Auto Ordnance Thompson type", therein, the statutes passes constitutional; muster. VI. BILL OF ATTAINDER (COUNT 4) Article First, Sec 13 of the Connecticut Constitution states: "No person of treason or felony by the legislature." Art. I Sec. 10 of the United states Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[n]o state shall...pass an Bill of Attainder." These Bill of Attainder provisions prohibit the state or federal legislatures from assuming judicial functions and conducting trials. UNITED STATES V. BROWN, 381 U.S. 437, 462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The key features of a bill attainder are that the challenged law "legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." NIXON V. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES., 433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed. 2d 867 (1977); see also STATE V. WASHBURN,34 Conn. App. 557, 563, __ A.2d __ (1994). A plaintiff challenging a legislative act on the ground that it is an unconstitutional bill attainder must prove three elements: nonjudicial infliction of punishment; spacificity as to the identity of individuals affected; and lack of a judicial trail. SPRINGFIELD ARMORY, INC. V. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra, 493; See 16A Am. Jur.2 Constitutional Law Section 655 (1979). These elements must be established by the "clearest proof." (Citations omitted.) Id. The plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers of guns named in the Act have been singled out for adverse treatment in the Act have been singled out for adverse treatment and legislatively condemned because of a relationship with an undesirable name. As a result, the plaintiffs claim that any manufacturer who makes and any citizen who owns or possesses a named gun have been attained. Specificity alone does not establish that the law is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. NIXON V. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, supra, 470-72. The court in NIXON concluded that "the Act's specificity, the fact that it refers to [President Nixon] by name, does not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id. 471-72. Similarly, the Present Act's specificity in naming weapons made by Colt, Springfield Armory, Heckler and Koch, Intratec, and other gun manufacturers does not render the Act a bill of attainder. FRESNO RIFLE AND PISTOL CLUB INC. V. VAN DE KAMP, 965 F.2d 723, 727-28 (9th Circuit 1992.) Furthermore, "[simply because a law places burdens in citizens does not make those burdens punishment." (Citation omitted.) STATE V. WASHBURN. supra, 563. Three tests have been identified as applicable to the determination whether the burden imposed by the legislature is punishment for bill of attainder purposes: the historical test; the functional test; and the motivational test. NIXON V. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, supra, 473-84. A. THE HISTORICAL TEST The historical test required the court to examine whether the burden imposed by the legislature falls within the category of punishments traditionally judged to be prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id., 473-74. These are: the death sentence; imprisonment; banishment; confiscation of property; and barring individuals or groups from participating in specified employments or vocations, Id. Plaintiffs' witnesses Benjamin, D'Andrea , and Carlos Garcia, the President of Intratech, offered testimony that their business have suffered as a result of passage of the Act. The plaintiffs however, have not proven that the Act bars them from participating in their specified employments or livelihood. The Act does not prevent plaintiff Intratec from manufacturing or selling firearms in general. Nor does it prevent Intratech from manufacturing the banned "assault weapons" and selling them places other than Connecticut. Moreover, the Act does not prohibit plaintiffs D'Andrea or Benjamin from selling or working on firearms and parts in the State of Connecticut other than those affected by the Act. For the foregoing reasons, the historical test for punishment has nor been satisfied. See SPRINGFIELD ARMORY, INC. V. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra, 494. B. THE FUNCTIONAL TEST The functional test requires the court to analyze whether the challenged law, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, can be said to further nonpunitive purposes. NIXON V. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, supra, 475-76. Where legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment was the purpose of the legislation. Id., 476. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving "that the legislature's action constituted punishment and not merely the legitimate regulations of conduct." Id., n. 40. The defendants assert that the Act was passed in light of legislative recognition that "assault weapons" are being used in street crime across Connecticut and that the proliferation of the guns is an intolerable threat to public safety. Defendants also argue that the Act will prevent tragedies such as the 1991 killing of State Trooper Russell Bagshaw. The court finds that the Act was designed to serve a nonpunitive purpose, namely the protection of the citizens of Connecticut from the perceived danger posed by certain firearms. As stated previously, this is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. Furthermore, in relation to the potential harm sought to be adverted by the Act, the severity of the burden on the plaintiffs s slight. The functional test for punishment has not been satisfied. See SPRINGFIELD ARMORY, INC. V. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra, 495. C. THE MOTIVATIONAL TEST The motivational test requires the court to determine whether the legislative history of the Act evinces an intent to punish.NIXON V. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, supra,478. In determining intent the court should also consider whether less burdensome alternatives were available. Id. 482. The plaintiffs have not offered, nor has the court found, any evidence of a legislative intent to punish the plaintiffs. To the contrary, the motivation of the legislature is clearly focused on public safety. see STATE V. WASHBURN, supra, 564. The plaintiffs have failed to established punishment under the motivational test. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that the burden imposed by the Act fits within any of the categories of punishments prohibited by the federal or state bill of attainder clause. The Act is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder. VI. CONCLUSION The plaintiffs' action for a declaratory judgment that he Act is void under the Connecticut Constitution, is denied. the court finds all issues in favor of the defendants subject to the narrowing construction of the statute contained herein. The application for a temporary in junction is denied. signed Judge Dranginis __ [This file came from the Shadow Forest BBS. I inserted line breaks and I converted single and double quotes into 7-bit ASCII versions, but did not otherwise edit the text. Typos may be from the original. -- Jeff Chan] __ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened: Section 1. (NEW) (a) As used in this act, "assault weapon" means: (1) Any selective-fire firearm capable of fully automatic, semi-automatic or burst fire at the option of the user or any of the following specified semi-automatic firearms: Algimec Agmi; Armalite AR-180; Australian Automatic Arms SAP Pistol; Auto-Ordnance Thompson type; Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 type; Barrett Light-Fifty model 82Al; Beretta AR-70; Bushmaster Auto Rifle and Auto Pistol; Calico models M-900, M-950 and lOO-P; Chartered Industries of Singapore SR-88; Colt AR-15 and Sporter; Daewoo K-l, K-2, Max-l and Max-2; Encom MK-IV, MP-9 and MP-45; Fabrique Nationale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, or FN/FNC; FAMAS MAS 223; Feather AT-9 and Mini-AT; Federal XC-900 and XC-450; Franchi SPAS-12 and LAW-12; Galil AR and ARM; Goncz High-Tech Carbine and High-Tech Long Pistol; Heckler & Koch HK-91, HK-93, HK-94 and SP-89; Holmes MP-83; MAC-10, MAC-ll and MAC-11 Carbine type; Intratec TEC-9 and Scorpion; Iver Johnson Enforcer model 3000; Ruger Mini-14/5F folding stock model only; Scarab Skorpion; SIG 57 AMT and 500 series; Spectre Auto Carbine and Auto Pistol; Springfield Armory BM59, SAR-48 and G-3; Sterling MK-6 and MK-7; Steyr AUG; Street Sweeper and Striker 12 revolving cylinder shotguns; USAS-12; UZI Carbine, Mini-Carbine and Pistol; Weaver Arms Nighthawk; Wilkinson "Linda" Pistol. (2) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon may be rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person. (b) As used in this act, the term "assault weapon" does not include any firearm modified to render it permanently inoperable. Sec. 2. (NEW) (a) (1) Any person who, within this state, distributes, transports or imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives any assault weapon, except as provided by this act, shall be guilty of a class C felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years may not be suspended or reduced. (2) Any person who transfers, sells or gives any assault weapon to a person under eighteen years of age in violation of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to the term of imprisonment imposed under subdivision (1) of this subsection. (b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to: (1) The sale of assault weapons to the department of public safety, police departments, the department of correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties; (2) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 4 of this act which is disposed of as authorized by the probate court, if the disposition is otherwise permitted by this act; (3) The transfer by bequest or intestate succession of an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 4 of this act. Sec. 3. (NEW) (a) Except as provided in section 5 of this act, any person who, within this state, possesses any assault weapon, except as provided in this act, shall be guilty of a class D felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which one year may not be suspended or reduced; except that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor if (1) the person presents proof that he lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to October 1, 1993, and (2) the person has otherwise possessed the firearm in compliance with subsection (d) of section 4 of this act. (b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of assault weapons by members or employees of the department of public safety, police departments, the department of correction or the military or naval forces of this state or the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties; or shall anything in this act prohibit the possession or use of assault weapons by sworn members of these agencies when on duty and the use is within the scope of their duties. (c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon by any person prior to July 1, 1994, if all of the following are applicable: (1) The person is eligible under this act to apply for a certificate of possession for the assault weapon by July 1, 1994; (2) The person lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to October 1, 1993; and (3) The person is otherwise in compliance with this act. (d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 4 of this act, if the assault weapon is possessed at a place set forth in subdivision (1) of subsection (d) of section 4 of this act or as authorized by the probate court. Sec. 4. (NEW) (a) Any person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon, as defined in section of this act, prior to October 1, 1993, shall apply by July 1, 1994, to the department of public safety, for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. The certificate shall contain a description of the firearm that identifies it uniquely, including all identification marks, the full name, address, date of birth and thumbprint of the owner, and any other information as the department may deem appropriate. The department shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 of the general statutes not later than January 1, 1994, to establish procedures with respect to the application for and issuance of certificates of possession pursuant to this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-19 and l-l9a of the general statutes, the name and address of a person issued a certificate of possession shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed, except such records may be disclosed to law enforcement agencies. (b) No assault weapon possessed pursuant to this section may be sold or transferred on or after January 1, 1994, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of section 6 of this act, or as provided in section 5 of this act, or by bequest or intestate succession. Any person who obtains title to an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under this section by bequest or intestate succession shall, within ninety days of obtaining title, apply to the department of public safety for a certificate of possession as provided in subsection (a) of this section, render the weapon permanently inoperable, sell the weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the weapon from the state. Any person who moves into the state in lawful possession of an assault weapon, shall, within ninety days, either render the weapon permanently inoperable, sell the weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the weapon from this state. (c) If an owner of an assault weapon sells or transfers the weapon to a licensed gun dealer, he shall, at the time of delivery of the weapon, execute a certificate of transfer and cause the certificate to be mailed or delivered to the commissioner of public safety. The certificate shall contain: (1) The date of sale or transfer; (2) the name and address of the seller or transferor and the licensed gun dealer, their social security numbers or motor vehicle operator license numbers, if applicable; (3) the licensed gun dealer's federal firearms license number and seller's permit number; (4) a description of the weapon, including the caliber of the weapon and its make, model and serial number; and (5) any other information the commissioner prescribes. The licensed gun dealer shall present his motor vehicle operator's license or social security card, federal firearms license and seller's permit to the seller or transferor for inspection at the time of purchase or transfer. The commissioner of public safety shall maintain a file of all certificates of transfer at his central office. (d) A person who has been issued a certificate of possession of an assault weapon under this section may possess it only under the following conditions: (1) At that person's residence, place of business or other property owned by that person, or on property owned by another with the owner's express permission; (2) While on the premises of a target range of a public or private club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets; (3) While on a target range which holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range; (4) While on the premises of a licensed shooting club; (5) While attending any exhibition, display or educational project which is about firearms and which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms; or (6) While transporting the assault weapon between any of the places mentioned in this subsection, or to any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of section 6 of this act, for servicing or repair pursuant to subsection (c) of section 6 of this act, provided the assault weapon is transported as required by section 6 of this act. Sec. 5. (NEW) Any individual may arrange in advance to relinquish an assault weapon to a police department or the department of public safety. The assault weapon shall be transported in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of this act. Sec. 6. (NEW) (a) While transporting an assault weapon between any of the places mentioned in subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of subsection (d) of section 4 of this act, no person shall carry a loaded assault weapon concealed from public view or knowingly have, in any motor vehicle owned, operated or occupied by him (1) a loaded assault weapon, or (2) an unloaded assault weapon unless such weapon is kept in the trunk of such vehicle or in a case or other container which is inaccessible to the operator of or any passenger in such vehicle. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both. (b) Any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of this section, who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to section 4 of this act, in addition to the uses allowed in section 4 of this act, may transport the assault weapon between dealers or out of the state, display it at any gun show licensed by a state or local governmental entity or sell it to a resident outside the state. Any transporting of the assault weapon allowed by this subsection must be done as required by subsection (a) of this section. (c) (1) Any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of this section, may take possession of any assault weapon for the purposes of servicing or repair from any person to whom has been issued a certificate of possession for such weapon pursuant to this act. (2) Any licensed gun dealer may transfer possession of any assault weapon received pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, to a gunsmith for purposes of accomplishing service or repair of the same. Transfers are permissible only to the following persons: (A) A gunsmith who is in the dealer's employ; (B) A gunsmith who the dealer has contracted for gunsmithing services, provided the gunsmith receiving the assault weapon holds a dealer's license issued pursuant to Chapter 44, commencing with Section 921, of Title 18 of the United States Code and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. (d) The term "licensed gun dealer", as used in this act means a person who has a federal firearms license and a permit to sell firearms pursuant to section 29-28 of the general statutes. Sec. 7. (NEW) Any person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon under this act that is stolen from him shall report the theft to law enforcement authorities within seventy-two hours of when such person discovered or should have discovered the theft. Sec. 8. (NEW) Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses an assault weapon, as defined in section 1 of this act, shall be imprisoned for a term of eight years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony. Sec. 9. (NEW) Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section 53a-3 of the general statutes, except an assault weapon, as defined in section 1 of this act, shall be imprisoned for a term of five years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony. Sec. 10. (NEW) The provisions of subsection (a) of section 2 and subsection (a) of section 3 of this act shall not apply to the temporary transfer or possession of an assault weapon, for which a certificate of possession has been issued pursuant to section 4 of this act, for purposes of transporting such weapon to and from any shooting competition or exhibition, display or educational project which is about firearms and which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms, which competition, exhibition, display or educational project is held outside this state. Sec. 11. (NEW) Nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing assault weapons in this state from manufacturing or transporting assault weapons in this state for sale within this state in accordance with subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 2 of this act or for sale outside this state. Sec. 12. "Subsection (h) of section 53a-46a of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof; (h) If no mitigating factor is present, the court shall impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by special verdict as provided in subsection (e) that (1) the defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and he had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE WITH AN ASSAULT WEAPON. AS DEFINED IN SECTION 1 OF THIS ACT." Sec. 13. (NEW) (a) Any person who purchases a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3 of the general statutes, pursuant to section 29-33 or 29-37a of the general statutes with the intent to transfer such firearm to any other person who the transferor knows or has reason to believe is prohibited from purchasing or other wise receiving such firearm pursuant to section 29-33 or 29-37a of the general statutes shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both. (b) Any person prohibited from purchasing or otherwise receiving or possessing a firearm and who solicits, employs, or assists any person in violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor. If the violation f subsection (a) of this section involves a transfer of more than one firearm, such person shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Each transfer shall constitute a separate offense. (c) Any person convicted of violating the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of the this section and who was convicted of a felony within the prior five-year period shall be guilty of a class D felony.